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Rosado v. Civiletti Tests the United States-
Mexico Prisoner Transfer Treaty
The United States-Mexico Prisoner Transfer Treaty' has spawned a
handful of habeas corpus suits in its short life.2 One of the most recent
cases is Rosado v. Civiletti, which concerned the situation of three United
States nationals imprisoned in Mexico who were transferred to the
United States under the Treaty and who subsequently petitioned for
habeas corpus relief from United States custody. The petitioners' case
was ultimately rejected in the face of overwhelming policy considera-
tions.8 This decision displays a critical weakness in the Treaty as it is
applied by the courts.
In response to public concern for the treatment of American prison-
ers in Mexico, Congress undertook extensive hearings and eventually ap-
proved a treaty proposed by Mexico, under the terms of which nationals
of either nation would be allowed to serve out the remainder of their
prison terms in their state of nationality. Although the transferred pris-
oners may benefit from amelioration of the condition of their incarcera-
tion under the Treaty,' the transferring state retains exclusive jurisdic-
tion over any proceedings to challenge, modify, or set aside a conviction
or sentence. 5 Primarily, the prisoners must consent to the transfer.6
In this case, the petitioners were arrested for alleged narcotics of-
fenseS7 in various Mexican airports as they were starting on their respec-
tive vacations. For several days, they were violently tortured in order to
draw out confessions. Transferred to prison after interrogation, they paid
large sums of money extorted for the basic necessities of life, for protec-
tion, and for "dormitory fee[s]," in addition to suffering continual tor-
ture9 and lack of heat and toilet facilities. Their imprisonment in Mexico
lasted about twenty-five months. They lived "in daily fear of bodily harm
1. Prisoner Transfer Treaty, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico, 28 U.S.T. 7399,
T.I.A.S. No. 8718 [hereinafter cited as the Treaty]. The enabling statute is contained in 18
U.S.C. § 3244 (Supp. II 1978).
2. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Pfeifer v.
Bureau of Prisons, 468 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. Cal. 1979), affd 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980).
3. 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. Advantages to the prisoner also include: (1) being held in a familiar cultural setting
with better accessibility by families; (2) the receiving state's law governs parole, which is
unavailable to drug offenders in Mexico; and (3) challenges to the constitutionality of the
Treaty will be heard by the receiving state.
5. Treaty, art. VI, 18 U.S.C. § 3244(1).
6. Treaty, art. VI(2), 18 U.S.C. § 3244(2).
7. No evidence was ever found or produced against any of the petitioners.
8. 621 F.2d at 1185 n.12.
9. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. 865, 870 n.12 (D. Conn. 1979).
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and believ[ed] that they would be killed if they remained incarcerated in
Mexico.""0
The petitioners were accorded minimum legal process. One week and
a half after their arrest and interrogation, they were briefly informed of
the cocaine importation charges as they stood crowded in a pen "sepa-
rated from the courtroom by a chain link fence."" A sort of arraignment
followed, and the officiating law secretary offered to help them at that
time for a fee, but they did not have enough money."' Next, there was an
appearance, without the opportunity for confrontation, by the officers
who had arrested just one of the petitioners.18 Seven months later the
petitioners were sentenced to nine years imprisonment.'
Petitioners initiated habeas corpus proceedings in the United States
after their return, challenging that their consent to custody in the hands
of the United States was obtained under extreme coercion and duress.
The district court granted their petitions,Velez v. Nelson," extensively
reiterating testimony regarding conditions of their Mexican imprison-
ment, and saying that "under the unique facts of this case, petitioners'
consents were not truly voluntary, and are therefore, invalid."'16 On ap-
peal by the United States, the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed,
holding that: (1) access to a United States Court is available where peti-
tioners are incarcerated under federal authority pursuant to foreign con-
victions and make a persuasive showing that their convictions were ob-
tained without benefit of any process whatsoever;'" but, (2) petitioners
were denied habeas corpus relief, on the principle of estoppel, by their
consent to the Treaty's assignment of jurisdiction.
The court's rationale was threefold. First, a desire to protect our rela-
tions with Mexico colors adjudication of the question since Mexico would
not have accepted the Treaty if the United States had required the right
to review Mexican criminal convictions. 8 Second, the statutory require-
ment that prisoners' consents be given freely and knowingly was fulfilled
to the satisfaction of the United States magistrate after interviewing the
prisoners." And third, in the interest ("of paramount importance"20 ) of
10. 621 F.2d at 1183.
11. Id. at 1185.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1186.
14. "At no time did they see the judge who sentenced them, obtain the assistance of
counsel, or confront the witnesses against them." Id.
15. 475 F. Supp. at 865.
16. Id. at 874.
17. The court expressly declined to impose the United States standard of process on
foreign systems. 621 F.2d at 1197-98. Cf. United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507
F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974) (normally a court will not inquire into internal legal procedures
which await an offender upon extradition).
18. 621 F.2d at 1200.
19. 621 F.2d at 1187. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4108.
20. 621 F.2d at 1200.
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other Americans imprisoned in Mexico, now and in the future, the peti-
tioners can and must be held to their original agreements since their con-
sents were found free from coercion."'
Problems in this decision rest in large measure with the Treaty itself
and its enabling legislation. Congress was concerned with obtaining con-
sents, or waivers, that would stand up to constitutional challenge in order
to ensure the validity of the Treaty" and the smooth processing of the
transfers. The intention was to place transferring prisoners in an estoppel
posture by their acceptance of the stated conditions, especially regarding
Mexican jurisdiction over challenges to convictions. 8 They therefore ap-
proved a "voluntary and with full knowledge of the consequenses
thereof""" standard by which to judge validity of consent. This court ap-
plied the standard very strictly, whereas the district court had found as a
matter of fact that petitioners' consents were the result of duress pro-
duced by brutality and were thus constitutionally suspect.2 ' Under the
"unique" facts of the case, the consents were invalidated in the district
court and writs granted.2 ' But the Second Circuit, taking their authority
from North Carolina v. Alford,17 said of these petitioners, "[i]f [their)
consents to transfer are viewed in light of the alternatives legitimately
available to them, it cannot be seriously doubted that their decisions were
voluntarily and intelligently made."28 The Alford standard they asserted
was: "not whether the defendant's decision reflected a wholly unre-
strained will, but rather whether it constituted a deliberate, intelligent
choice between available alternatives."' In contrast, the district court
had said the extent of duress was so great that "petitioners would have
signed anything, regardless of the consequences, to get out of Mexico,"'' s a
fact recognized by the Second Circuit, but given no weight by them. In
light of their acceptance of this finding by the lower court, the appellate
court's holding amounts to a rule that a criminal defendant who is offered
a choice between two alternatives, and chooses either, waives his right to
relief on the ground of duress, no matter what the circumstances.' It
21. "We refuse to scuttle the one certain opportunity open to Americans incarcerated
abroad to return home, an opportunity, we note, the benefit of which [the petitioners] have
already received." Id.
22. Id. at 1198.
23. Id.
24. Treaty, art. V, para. 1, 18 U.S.C. § 3245.
25. 475 F. Supp. at 873. See also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
26. 475 F. Supp. at 874.
27. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
28. 621 F.2d at 1191.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1183.
31. 621 F.2d at 1190.
If, here, the conduct of Mexican officials on Mexican soil were held to be deter-
minative of the voluntariness of an American prisoner's consent to transfer,
those prisoners most desperately in need of transfer to escape torture and
extortion, including the petitioners at bar, would never be able to satisfy a
1980
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must follow that if no consent or waiver of constitutional rights can be
found to be involuntary, under its own facts, then no consent can be
found to be voluntary. To that extent, the Treaty's standard is applied
unconstitutionally by this court. By limiting the possibilities of an invalid
consent, the holding impairs the protection that the Treaty provides by
requiring a valid consent for waiver of challenge to the Mexican convic-
tion in other than Mexican courts. It seems especially unfair to use con-
sent in this context against a habeas corpus petitioner on the basis of a
theory of estoppel .3
The causes of international human rights and of the fundamental
rights of persons in foreign prisons would be better served if the United
States assiduously pursued other nations' acknowledgement of and adher-
ence to those rights rather than by such application of this particular
treaty. Although the idea is a good one, its execution leaves unchallenged
a gross violation of rights by avoiding the issue and thus keeping it out of
international focus. Perhaps the other treaties entered into in this same
area3 3 will be administered so as to vindicate Americans' rights, but in the
case of the Mexican treaty, as Rosado v. Civiletti shows, there is just too
much strain on the law's integrity for it to stand as is.
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magistrate that their consents were voluntarily given.
Id.
32. The estoppel theory requires reliance by the United States to its detriment. Grant-
ing that there is no law enforcement interest claimed by the government, the court upheld
two other interests: (1) the government's interest in relations with Mexico by honoring its
criminal convictions and recognizing the integrity of its criminal justice system (but cf.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (act of state doctrine)); and (2)
the interest of those who will similarly become victims in the future. 621 F.2d 1190.
33. In addition to the treaties with Mexico and Canada, the Senate has approved a
similar treaty with Bolivia. Treaties with Panama, Peru, and Turkey have been approved
for ratification, but have not yet become effective. Each of these treaties contains a provi-
sion similar to article VI of the Mexican Treaty, which confers exclusive jurisdiction over
challenges to convictions and sentences to the courts of the transferring nation. See, e.g.,
Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia, T.I.A.S.
No. 9219, reprinted in S. ExEc. Doc. No. 6, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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